Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

The State of Utah v. Dell D. Archuleta : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Lisa J. Remal; Ron S. Fujino; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Archuleta, No. 900375 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2750

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

OT AM COURT OF APPEALS
RP»fF

DO.

•'--'< .,—IHJCHE COURT Of APPEALS OF TLB SfA'if. OF UTATT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900375-CA

DELL D. ARCHULETA,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from an order revoking probation following an Order
to Show Cause hearing before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, presiding
judge in the Third Judicial district Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

LISA J. REMAL
RON S. FUJINO
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Appellee

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900375-CA
Priority No. 2

DELL D. ARCHULETA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from an order revoking probation following an Order
to Show Cause hearing before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, presiding
judge in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

LISA J. REMAL
RON S. FUJINO
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

11
iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . .

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
POINT: APPELLANTS PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN REVOKED BECAUSE HIS NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION WAS NOT WILLFUL . . . . _
A. ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE WAIVED ITS
RIGHT TO REQUIRE APPELLANTS STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROBATION AGREEMENT .

CONCLUSION

8
10

B. APPELLANTS PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN REVOKED FOR HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO
MAINTAIN LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT

15

C. APPELLANTS PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN REVOKED FOR HIS FINANCIAL NONCOMPLIANCE
BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO PAY THE COURT
ORDERED AMOUNTS

17
23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)

8, 22

Kummli v. Myers, 400 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968)

11,14,15

Rich v. State, 640 P.2d 159 (Alaska App. 1982)

18

State v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91 (Utah App. 1989)

18

State v. Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1990). 2,8,10,18,22

11

Page
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §62A-11-104 (6) (Supp. 1990)

21

Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-208 (1980)

11,15

Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-209 (1980)

11,15

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Blacks Law Dictionary, 1434 (5th Ed. 1979)

•• •
111

9

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900375-CA
Priority No, 2

DELL D. ARCHULETA,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-104(6) (Supp. 1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 (1980)
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-209 (1980)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in determining that Dell Archuleta
had failed to comply with the terms of his probation?
1.

Did Dell Archuleta willfully fail to maintain
employment?

2.

Did Dell Archuleta willfully fail to submit a
monthly report for the month of May, 1990?

3.

Did Dell Archuleta willfully fail to pay the
court ordered fine and child support payments?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before revoking probation, the State must prove "a
violation of a condition of probation [by] a preponderance of the
evidence."

State v. Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 45 (Utah App.

1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On October 6, 1989, a jury convicted Dell D. Archuleta of
Theft, a second degree felony, and Theft by Deception, a class B
misdemeanor.

(R 25, 26). The Honorable Pat Brian suspended his

sentence, a prison term, and instead imposed an eighteen month
period of probation with accompanying conditions.
On May 18, 1990, Karl Bartell of Adult Parole and Probation
[AP&P], filed an "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" with
the trial court, alleging various probation violations.

(R 80-81) .

On June 20, 1990, following the Order to Show Cause hearing, the
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court found that Dell Archuleta had violated his probation as
alleged in four allegations of AP&P7s affidavit.

(R 95-96).

The

court then reinstated another probationary term and added some more
conditions.

(R 96).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 6, 1989, a jury convicted Dell D. Archuleta of
Theft, a second degree felony, and Theft by Deception, a class B
misdemeanor.

(R 25, 26). The Honorable Pat Brian sentenced

Mr. Archuleta to a prison term of one to fifteen years and a fine of
$10,000.

(R 73-75).

Both penalties were then stayed and the court

instead imposed an eighteen month period of probation which included
the following conditions.
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of
Adult Probation & Parole.

Pay a fine in the amount of $1000 . . . or at the rate
of [$]100.00 month starting January 1, 1990.
Pay restitution in the amount of $77.00 . . . at a
rate of in full by 6-1-90

Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
week.

40 hours a

[Defendant] must obtain employment by Oct 16, 1989.
[Defendant] must pay child support as ordered starting
Nov 1, 1989. $75.00 per month.
- 3
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All child support arrearages must be paid in 18 months
at a rate of $225.00 per month. Total payment $300.00
per month. 1/2 at 1st month - 1/2 half on 15th month.
(R 73-74) (Addendum B ) .
After Dell Archuleta was placed on probation, he signed a
probation agreement dated October 19, 1989.

Transcript of Order to

Show Cause Hearing (June 20, 1990) (hereinafter referred to as "T")
at 26.

Kevin Nitzel of Adult Parole and Probation initially

supervised Archuleta and explained the agreement to him.
34).

(T 4,

One of the conditions of probation required Archuleta to

submit a monthly report.1

(R 78).

Archuleta complied with this

requirement while he was supervised by Nitzel, from the start of his
probation until January, 1990.

(T 10-11, 13). Frequently, however,

Kevin Nitzel reminded Archuleta that he was late in filling out the
monthly report.

(T 20, 23). Archuleta would respond immediately,

completing the report the same day as he was called or shortly
thereafter.

(T 20).

In February, 1990, another probation officer, Harvey Van
Katwyk, began supervising Dell Archuleta.

(T 9).

When Archuleta

did not complete a monthly report, Van Katwyk reminded him of his
obligation.
request.

(T 13-14).

Archuleta responded immediately to his

(T 14, 20).

1

The "monthly report," though referred to and admitted as
Exhibit 1 during the Order to Show Cause Hearing (T. 7 ) , cannot be
found within the record. The actual probation agreement signed by
Dell Archuleta was never made part of the record.
- 4
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In addition to the monthly report, Archuleta was required
to "maintain verifiable, lawful employment and/or education" and to
make court ordered fines and payments.

(R 78, 81). Dell Archuleta

obtained full time employment at the Red Lion Hotel from "around
Thanksgiving [1989]" until "around February [1990.]"

(T 14-15).

He

received "$3.50 an hour" plus "gratuity pay" of "about $20 extra"
each paycheck.

(T 14, 15). Archuleta eventually left his job after

being accused of stealing somebody's eyeglasses.

(T 15).

Archuleta also obtained temporary and part time
employment.

(T 18).

His job search included applications filed at

Mulboon's; Village Inn; Coachman's; Doubletree; Marriott's; Coyote
Bill's; and Su Casa.

(T 16).

Through his frequent visits to Job

Service, Archuleta often received temporary employment.

(T 18).

His income, however, could not cover his living expenses.
His expenses included the rent; a hospital bill; his phone
bill; the electricity; gas; and food.

(T 18, 19). He also paid his

ex-wife, Mercy, to see his four year old daughter, Veronica. (T 19,
42).

Because of his financial situation, Archuleta arranged a

partial payment schedule with the collecting agencies.

(T 21, 24).

Yet Archuleta still did not have enough money to consistently pay
his entire rent.

(T 21).

At best, he had $5 or $10 extra when he

was fully employed at the Red Lion.

(T 24).

But his "spare" income

would never be enough to cover such necessary expenses as a dental
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bill.

(T 17).

Though ill and debilitated from the effects of an

abscessed tooth, Archuleta could not afford dental treatment.
"pulled the tooth out" himself.

He

(T 17).

Archuleta was ill "through March, after April," at about
the same time probation officer Karl Bartell was assigned to his
case.

(T 17).

Having never met Archuleta, Bartell attempted to

contact him on or about April 3, 1990.

(T 10, 21). Bartell was

unable to reach Archuleta and left a message at his residence.
Archuleta returned Bartell's phone call and the two met the next
day.

(T 6, 9 ) . Bartell and Archuleta discussed the probation

agreement in a manner similar to prior discussions between other
probation officers and Archuleta.

For example, once an officer was

assigned to supervise Archuleta, he contacted Archuleta for "a
discussion on his probation, what he was supposed to do, [and] how
he was supposed to conduct himself on probation."
with (T 33-34).

Compare (T 6-7)

When Archuleta forgot to fill out the April monthly

report, Karl Bartell, like the other probation officers who had
supervised Archuleta, reminded Dell of his monthly obligation.
(T 20, 23). As in the past, Archuleta quickly complied with the
officer's request.

(T 23).

For the month of May, however,

Archuleta did not complete a monthly report, nor was he reminded of
this obligation.

(T 23).

On May 18, 1990, Karl Bartell filed a "Progress/Violation
Report" and an "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" with
the court, alleging various probation violations.

- 6
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(R 78-81).

The

affidavit alleged that Archuleta did not submit his monthly report
for the month of May; that he established another residence without
notifying AP&P; that he did not maintain employment or education;
and that he failed to pay the fine or the child support payments.
(R 80-81) (Addendum C ) .
On June 20, 1990, the State and Mr. Archuleta both appeared
before the Honorable Pat Brian to set forth their respective
positions.

(R 112); (T 3-49).

The court found that Dell Archuleta

had violated his probation by failing to submit a monthly report for
the month of May, 1990; by failing to maintain lawful employment
and/or education; by failing to pay $100 per month towards his fine;
and by failing to pay $300 per month towards the child support
obligation.

(R 95-96) (Addendum D).

The court did not find that

Archuleta had unlawfully changed his residence.

(T 31).

The court then revoked Archuleta's probation and reinstated
another eighteen month period of probation with the following
conditions:
1. That all conditions of probation previously
imposed be in effect.
2. That he serve six months in jail with credit for
time served.
3. That within fifteen calendar days from his release
from jail, he be employed sixty hours per week, and
that he provide written verification of the same.
4. That he be enrolled in vocational training as soon
as possible after his release from jail, but no later
than ninety days from that release . . . .
(R 91, 96) (Addendum D ) .
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court should not have revoked Dell Archuleta's
probation as his noncompliance with the terms of probation was not
willful.

AP&P's repeated acceptance of, and acquiescence to, the

monthly reports filed belatedly by Archuleta constituted a waiver of
its right to require strict compliance of the probation agreement.
The conduct of the respective parties was also relevant to determine
the meaning of the terms of the agreement.
Dell Archuleta did maintain lawful employment during the
period of his probation through full-time, part-time, and temporary
employment.

The unskilled positions, however, did not pay him

enough money to cover his necessary living expenses and all of the
court ordered payments.

Nevertheless Dell did pay his ex-wife child

support payments, in amounts proportionate to his ability to pay,
though he was unable to pay the entire amounts due.

But a court

cannot revoke probation for the nonpayment of court ordered amounts
if, as here, the probationer's noncompliance was not willful.

Dell

Archuleta made good faith efforts to abide by the conditions of his
probation.

The court erred in its determination.
ARGUMENT
POINT

APPELLANT'S PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED
BECAUSE HIS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
PROBATION WAS NOT WILLFUL.
"[I]n order to revoke probation, a violation of a probation
condition must, as a general rule, be willful."

State v. Hodges,

142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990); Bearden v. Georgia, 461
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U.S. 660 (1983).

"An act or omission is 'willfully' done if [there

is a] specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be
done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law."

Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979).

"The word [willfully] . . . when used in a criminal context . . .
means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse;
stubbornly, obstinately, perversely."

Id.

As explained below, Dell

Archuleta did not willfully violate his probation.
On May 18, 1990, Dell Archuleta's probation officer, Karl
Bartell, filed an "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" with
the court which alleged the following violations:
1. The defendant [Dell Archuleta] has . . . not
submitted his monthly reports for May by the 5th of
the month as agreed to by the defendant;
2. The defendant has . . . changed or established
another residence without notifying or knowledge of
his probation agent. . . .
3. The defendant has failed to maintain verifiable,
lawful employment and/or education;
4. The defendant has . . . failed to pay the minimum
amount set by the Court of $100.00 per month towards
his fine as required by the Court; and
5. The defendant has . . . failed to make any child
support payments, and any payments towards the child
support arrears; which was to be at a rate of $225.00
per month with total payments being $300.00 per month.
(R 80-81) (Addendum C). Following arguments posed by the respective
parties during the order to show cause hearing, the court found Dell
Archuleta in violation of four of the five allegations.

(R 95-96).

The court did not find that Archuleta had unlawfully changed his
residence.

(T 31).
- 9
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A.

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE WAIVED ITS RIGHT
TO REQUIRE APPELLANT'S STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
THE PROBATION AGREEMENT.

The first violation found by the court, noncompliance with
the monthly report requirement for the month of May, 1990, should
not have been deemed a violation which supported the revocation of
probation.

Rather, AP&P's repeated acceptance of the monthly

reports filed belatedly by Dell Archuleta evidenced AP&P's
willingness to forego a strict interpretation of the probation
agreement.

Indeed, the conduct of the respective parties was

relevant to determine whether AP&P waived or modified the terms of
the agreement.
"[A] probation agreement . . . is essentially a contract
with the court; the court agrees to stay part or all of the
statutory sentence, and the probationer in turn agrees to perform or
abstain from performing certain acts."
Adv. Rep. 39, 45 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Hodges, 142 Utah

AP&P also plays a vital role in

the contract; it acts as an extension of the court in monitoring the
performance of the probationer and makes its own conditions of
probation.
The performance agreed upon between Dell Archuleta and AP&P
required Dell to submit a monthly report by the 5th of each month2

2

AP&P's "Progress/Violation Report" alleged that Dell
Archuleta did "not [submit] his monthly report for May by the 5th of
the month as agreed to by the defendant, also reports for January,
February, and March[.]" (R 78). Apparently, at the beginning of
his probation, Dell agreed to file a report each month rather than
just for the month of May.
- 10 -

to the probation department.

See (R 78, 80). Their agreement is

analogous to a debtor/creditor agreement which requires the debtor
to submit payments by the 5th of each month or the creditor will
enforce the obligations of the agreement.

However, regardless of

what the contract may state, if the creditor repeatedly accepts the
debtor's untimely payments, a court will find that the creditor has
waived its right to enforce the strict terms of their agreement.
See, e.g., Kummli v. Myers, 400 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
In Kummli, three promissory notes "provided[, inter alia,]
that if the makers were in default with respect to the payment of
the installments as they became due and payable, the unpaid balance
of the principal and accrued interest were to become due and payable
at once at the option of the noteholders . . . "

Id. at 775. The

debtors made payments:
irregularly and without protest [by the creditors] as
to the delay. . . . At no time prior to [the demand
for payment] had there been a suggestion that failure
on the part of the [debtors] to make payment on the
first of each month would result in a demand for
accelerated payment of the entire balance of principal
and interest. From the outset, in short, the record
indicates a waiver of strict compliance with the terms
of the respective [promissory] notes.
. . .

[B]y operation of equity the course of conduct of
the parties may bring about a modification of their
strict legal rights and obligations to the point that
the creditor could be said to have created a waiver of
its right to accelerate "without at least implicitly
giving prior notice of its intention to do so should
default again occur."
Kummli, 400 F.2d at 776-77 (citations omitted); accord Utah Code
Ann. §§ 70A-2-208, -209 (1980)

- 11 -

Similarly, the "debtor" here, Dell Archuleta, was also
required to satisfy his monthly requirement pursuant to the strict
terms of his agreement.

Yet because AP&P, like the creditor in

Kummli, repeatedly accepted the irregular and untimely monthly
performances, AP&P effectively waived its right to enforce the terms
of the agreement.3

No prior notice of AP&P's changed intention was

given to Archuleta.
When Dell Archuleta met with his first probation officer,
Kevin Nitzel, Nitzel recorded that he had "signed the defendant up
on probation, all conditions explained, defendant was referred for
[an] evaluation, and needs a job ASAP."
added).

(T 33-34) (emphasis

Following their discussion, however, Archuleta forgot to

fill out the monthly report.

(T 20, 23). Nitzel would call

Archuleta, reminding him of the monthly requirement.

(T 20).

Archuleta responded immediately, completing the report the same day
as he was called or shortly thereafter.

(T 20).

Kevin Nitzel

considered the "violation" harmless, having never instituted an
Order to Show Cause hearing for the revocation of Archuleta's
probation.

3

AP&P's acceptance of, and acquiescence to, the
performance of Dell Archuleta should extend to all of the alleged
violations stated in the "Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show
Cause." (R 80-81). For example, Archuleta's situation at the time
of Karl Bartell's supervision was almost identical in every respect
to his situation at the time of Kevin Nitzel's and Harvey Van
Katwyk's supervision. Just as Nitzel and Van Katwyk did not seek
revocation proceedings for Archuleta's alleged noncompliance, so too
should Bartell be estopped, absent appropriate notice, from revoking
his probation for the very same conduct when it had been previously
allowed by the other two officers. See infra note 4 and
accompanying text.
- 12 -

The second probation officer, Harvey Van Katwyk, allowed a
course of performance similar to that permitted by Nitzel.

If Dell

Archuleta forgot the monthly report, Van Katwyk would request
compliance, and Dell would respond immediately.

(T 20):

Q [By defense counsel]: Dell, were there any months
that you didn't report to somebody at the probation
department?
A [By Dell Archuleta]: Just the last month. But
there [were] times where I would forget. I know that
sounds terrible. I would forget. Like Kevin would
call me, or Harvey would call me, and [tell me], Dell,
you forgot again. Right away, I knew what they were
talking about. I would go in either that day or the
following day and take care of it.
(T 2 0).

Once, when Archuleta forgot to fill out the monthly report

during his course of dealing with Van Katwyk, Harvey "came to
[Archuleta's] house and asked how I was doing.
fill out the report.

He said I forgot to

So I went in the next day."

(T 14).

Despite

Archuleta's noncompliance with the terms of his agreement, Van
Katwyk never commenced probation revocation proceedings against
him.

Van Katwyk and Kevin Nitzel both gave Archuleta "leeway" in

fulfilling the conditions of his probation agreement.
The third probation officer, Karl Bartell, also acted in a
manner resembling the two preceding officers.

In April, 1990,

Bartell left a message at the Archuleta residence for him to call
AP&P.

(T 9).

very next day.

Archuleta responded, reporting to the officer the
(T 10).

As he had done with his other probation

officers, Archuleta discussed his probation with Bartell,
confirming

"what he [Archuleta] was supposed to do, [and] how he

was supposed to conduct himself on probation."
- 13 -

(T 6-7). Archuleta

"agreed to start making some of his restitution payments and his
back child support payments, and he would get out and get a job, and
that he would come in monthly and fill out his reports, and start
doing what his probation agreement stated to."

(T 7-8).

In other

words, Dell Achuleta made the same agreements that he had made with
the other probation officers.

Compare (T 6-7) with (T 33-34).

Karl Bartell did not notify Archuleta of his intention to
revoke probation for noncompliance through means any different than
the other probation officers.

Bartell did review the conditions of

probation and discuss "what [Archuleta] was suppose to do," but
their discussion was consistent with Archuleta's prior discussions
with Kevin Nitzel and Harvey Van Katwyk.4

Just as the district

court in Kummli had "failed to take [into] account . . . the
equities" of the situation, Kummli v. Myers, 400 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), the district court here also failed to recognize

4

Karl Bartell was an inexperienced probation officer who
had not supervised any probationers prior to March, 1990, the time
at which he was assigned to Dell Archuleta's case. (T 4, 9). While
Bartell may have had with good intentions, he overreacted to the
perceived violations. Archuleta was in an almost identical
situation in regards to his employment, his monthly reports, and his
finances throughout the period of his probation. His alleged
noncompliance with the first two officers mirrored his alleged
noncompliance with Karl Bartell. Officers Nitzel and Van Katwyk
recognized that Archuleta, a first time offender of a nonviolent
crime with many personal problems and no marketable skills,
(T 35-38), was an individual doing the best he could under the
circumstances. Neither officer ever suggested that revocation
proceedings were appropriate. Only officer Bartell, perhaps in an
overzealous attempt to establish a "hard-nosed" reputation,
considered Dell Archuleta's conduct so egregious that it warranted a
"commit[ment] to the Utah State Prison for the term prescribed by
law."
(R 79).
- 14 -

that a waiver or modification of the strict terms of the agreement
resulted from AP&P's continued acquiescence to Archuleta's prior
course of performance.

The principles of Kummliy a civil case, are

even more compelling here because the protections afforded Dell
Archuleta, a probationer, should be greater than the "equities"
permitted a debtor of a loan or a seller of goods.

Cf. Utah Code

Ann. §§ 70A-2-208, -209 (1980) (statutory provisions dealing with
the course of performance and modifications, rescissions, and
waivers between buyers and sellers of goods).

B.

APPELLANT'S PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED
FOR HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO MAINTAIN LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT

In its order, the court also found that Dell Archuleta had
"failed to maintain verifiable, lawful employment and/or
education . . . "
(R 95). In addition, the court noted:
This Court will take judicial notice that from South
Temple to 5300 South on State Street, on any given
day, there are probably 15 or 20 help wanted signs
posted in living color in the windows of business
establishments. Employment in this community can be
had, if a person is serious about being employed.
Compensation may not be more than minimum wage.
Nevertheless, it is there for a person serious about
being employed.
(T 31). While some of the court7s statements may have been correct,
its finding that Dell Archuleta had not maintained lawful employment
was in error.
Dell Archuleta obtained full-time employment at the Red
Lion Hotel from "around Thanksgiving [1989]" until "around February
[1990.]"

(T 14-15).

After his employer accused him of stealing

i

- 15 -

someone's eyeglasses, Archuleta quit the job.

(T 15).

Thereafter,

though, Dell obtained temporary and part-time employment through Job
Service.

(T 18).

His repeated efforts at obtaining employment

rewarded him with a "preferred customer in need of work11 type of
status at Job Service:

"[T]he people [at Job Service] knew me

[Archuleta], so sometimes, they would call me over there and say, We
have a job.

Do you want to go?

Yeah, I would go."

(T 18).

Dell

Archuleta also worked part-time for his mother, Lillian, a woman who
had attempted to renew their relationship after abandoning Dell when
he was a baby.
week."

(T 18, 22). He worked for her at least "once a

(T 18).
When Archuleta was not employed or ill, he was actively

searching for work.

He filed applications at various establishments

including Mulboon's; Village Inn; Coachman's; Doubletree;
Marriott's; Coyote Bill's; and Su Casa.

(T 16).

Dell Archuleta's

testimony was not rebutted or even questioned by the State.5
Archuleta's undisputed testimony reflects that he was in fact
"serious about being employed."

He may not have looked on State

Street, but he did find employment elsewhere.

His candor in

admitting his felony conviction on the job applications may

5

The State did not dispute Dell Archuleta's testimony
concerning his employment. Rather, they attempted to use his
employment against him by arguing that he should have had money to
pay the court ordered amounts. But see infra, Point I.e.
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have limited his marketability,6 (T 15), even for minimum wage
employment, but his bona fide efforts to find a job and his actual
periods of full-time, part-time, and temporary employment should not
have been ignored by the court.

C.

APPELLANT'S PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
REVOKED FOR HIS FINANCIAL NONCOMPLIANCE
BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO PAY THE COURT
ORDERED AMOUNTS

The remaining "justifications" given by the court for its
decision to revoke probation concerned the defendant's failure to
pay $100.00 per month towards his fine and $300.00 per month in
child support payments.

(R 95-96).

The basis for the court's

decision may be gleaned from the rhetorical questions the court
asked itself at the end of the order to show cause hearing:
The Court has listened to all the testimony,
reviewed the evidence. The Court has a number of
questions that have been asked silently and
rhetorically to the Court.

6

Most of the help wanted signs the court referred to on
State Street probably encompassed fast food restaurants in need of
cashiers or establishments giving employees easy access to the cash
of incoming customers. (T 31). Dell Archuleta was convicted of
Theft, a second degree felony, and Theft by Deception, a class B
misdemeanor. (R 25, 26). Besides the usual negative stigma
confronting convicted felons, the nature of Dell Archuleta's
convictions would make even the most forgiving owner hesitant about
employing Mr. Archuleta.
- 17 -

If the defendant in fact was gainfully employed
for any period of time during his probation agreement,
why was not a token payment made, either in the form
of restitution, the fine or child support? A token
payment, $5, $10, $20. Any amount of money to
persuade the Court that the defendant was mindful of
that responsibility, and serious about discharging it.
(T 29, 30). The court erred in at least two material respects.
First, the court never informed Dell Archuleta that token payments
would satisfy the conditions of his probation.

Second, Archuleta

did in fact make token payments toward his financial obligations.
The court never communicated its willingness to accept
partial payments as a basis for satisfying Archuleta's probation.
In State v. Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1990), this
Court followed:
the requirement that a probationer be clearly and
accurately apprised of the expectations for remaining
on probation. See State v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91, 93
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (probation sentences must be
rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid
the possibility of confusion and injustice); Rich v.
State, 640 P.2d 159, 162 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(probation conditions must be sufficiently precise and
unambiguous to inform probationer of conduct essential
to retain liberty).
Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. When the court sentenced
Archuleta and imposed his probation, it said nothing about token
amounts.

Instead, the court stressed complete payments:

"The Court

expects that child support and arrearages to be paid in full, your
current child support to be maintained, the fine to be paid, and the
restitution to be paid."

(R 111) (Transcript of October 6, 1989

sentencing proceeding when probation was originally imposed at
page 7) (emphasis added).

Since the court did not then clearly
- 18 -

convey the boundaries of permissible conforming conduct to
Mr. Archuleta, it cannot now use or consider the alleged absence of
the token payments against him by stating, in essence, that partial
payments would have been sufficient.
More importantly, however, was the court's failure to
recognize that Dell Archuleta did in fact make payments towards the
court ordered amounts.

Dell's ex-wife, Mercy, required monetary

payments before she allowed him to see their daughter:
Q [By defense counsel]: Was there any expense
involved in your visits with your daughter?
A [Dell Archuleta]: I would give Mercy money,
sometimes, if I could see her, like if she would spend
the night or something, food. I can't afford to go
out to restaurants.
. . .

Mercy was letting me see Veronica. I thought
that's good. She told me to pay $20 a month, at least.
.

. •

It is all I can do, give Mercy money to see
Veronica. Sometimes she charges me a lot of money to
see her. Lately, she has been letting me see her.
(T 19, 20, 42). The court, however, found the defendant
irresponsible and categorized his contentions as "a bunch of
baloney."

(T 42).

Yet there was nothing in the record which

rebutted Archuleta's testimony that he gave Mercy money to see
Veronica.

(T 19, 20, 42). Though Archuleta may have believed them
- 19 -

to be visitation payments,7 the money went towards his court ordered
obligations and should have been properly classified as the
functional equivalent of child support payments.
His direct payments to Mercy were no different than
indirect payments submitted to the Division of Recovery Services
who, in turn, would have paid Mercy on Archuleta's behalf.

In fact

if Mercy had said, "Dell, before you can see Veronica you must first
pay some of your child support obligations," the end result would
have been the same.

Mislabeling aside, Archuleta's "visitation"

payments constituted "child support" payments.
Admittedly, Dell Archuleta did not pay the entire amount
due but if the court had desired proof of only a "token payment
. . . to persuade the Court that the defendant was mindful of [his
financial responsibilities]," Archuleta's payments reflected the
appropriate state of mind.

Indeed, considering Dell Archuleta's

financial situation, his "token payments" were quite substantial
given the fact that the visitation payments actually drew from his
necessary living expenses.

7 Because Dell Archuleta did not make the payments through
the Division of Recovery Services, he may not have considered the
"visitation" or extortion type payments as child support payments.
Thus, when asked if he had paid "a penny" towards the court ordered
payments, Archuleta said, "No." (T 21, 24). However, as discussed
above in the text accompanying this footnote, Dell's visitation
payments were the equivalent of child support payments.
- 20 -

Dell#s indebtedness included expenses for his rent; a
hospital bill; the phone bill; the electricity; gas; and food.
(T 18-19).

His lack of education and the continuing effects of a

"car accident" injury qualified him for nothing more than minimum
wage employment.

(T 15).

Archuleta's monthly salary, even when he

was fully employed, often could not cover his entire rent.

(T 21).

After taxes, his wages would never be enough to satisfy, in full,
all of his monthly financial obligations.

(T 21).

Dell could not

even afford dental treatment for his abscessed tooth.

(T 17).

He

pulled the tooth out himself, (T 17), thereby saving some money for
the visitation payments which could have otherwise gone towards the
needed dental treatment.
While Dell could have refused to pay his bills, he chose
instead to arrange a partial payment schedule with the hospital, the
utility company, and the gas company.

(T 20, 21). Even the "people

at Recovery Services" understood his financial predicament and
permitted bit payments to accommodate his situation.

I

(T 20).

...

The Division of Recovery Services, though empowered with
great statutory authority "to collect . . . criminal assessments,
fines, [or] fees . . . owed to the state[,]" Utah Code Ann.
§ 62A-11-104(6) (1990), did nothing during the entire period of
probation to collect the outstanding amounts still due.

There were

no garnishment proceedings, no income withholding orders, and no
lien actions instituted against Archuleta.

Dell did not ignore the

Division; rather Archuleta maintained a proper relationship with
them.

He did what he could under the circumstances:
- 21 -

I [Dell Archuleta] would have kind of a good
relationship with people at Recovery Services, They
know me fairly well. I have been going to see them
for a while now. I told them that I hadn't been
working. When I was working, I would tell them. They
would say, Just pay her this much. When I wasn't
working, I would tell them, I am not working right now.
(T 20).

Dell's mistake, if any, was making direct payments to his

ex-wife, Mercy, rather than paying the Division gf Recovery
Services.

However, his direct approach still provided Mercy with

child support payments.
Dell took money from his salary in order to see his
daughter.

He actually placed himself further into indebtedness by

using some of his income, all of which were needed for his living
expenses and the collecting agencies, to pay his ex-wife for the
privilege of seeing Veronica.
In short, Dell Archuleta did not "act with a bad purpose"
by failing to make the court ordered payments.
unable to comply.

He was financially

Dell did make payments to Mercy and given his

indebtedness, he made substantial inroads towards his obligations.
Even under the most favorable circumstances, however, Archuleta
could not have paid the amounts ordered in full.

But the trial

court cannot revoke his probation because of his indigent status.
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).

Dell Archuleta's

noncompliance with probation must be "willful."
142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Hodges,

Dell did not

"stubbornly, obstinately, [or] perversely" refuse to comply, nor did
- 22 -

he have an abundance of money which he simply withheld from Mercy or
the court.

The court erred in its decision to revoke Dell

Archuleta's probation for financial noncompliance.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's decision to revoke his probation.
SUBMITTED this

jfi

day of October, 1990.

j)\bd

C , . fcmgj?

LISA J . JREMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RONISTFUJINO
RONl
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
IJ RON S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the

I

foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

\o

day of October, 1990.

RON iS. FUJ3JNO «
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DELIVERED by
this

day of October, 1990.
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ADDENDUM A

62A-11-104. Duties of office.
The office has the following duties:
(1) to collect child support from an obligor if the department has provided public assistance, or if the department has contracted to collect
support;
(2) to carry at the obligations of the department contained in this
chapter, in Chapters 45 and 45a of Title 78, and in Chapter 31, Title 77,
for the purpose of collecting child support;
(3) to recover public assistance provided to persons for which they were
ineligible;
(4) to collect money due the department which could act to offset expenditures by the state;
(5) to cooperate with the federal government in programs designed to
recover health and social service funds;
(6) to collect civil or criminal assessments, fines, fees, amounts
awarded as restitution, and reimbursable expenses owed to the state or
any of its political subdivisions, if the office has contracted to provide
collection services;
(7) to implement income withholding for collection of child support in
accordance with Part 4 of this chapter; and
(8) to finance any costs incurred from collections.
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical construction.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course
of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall
be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other;
but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall
control course of performance and course of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade (section 70a-l-2Q5).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a
waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course
of performance.
70A-2-209. Modification, rescission and waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this chapter needs no
consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or
rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on
a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the
other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this chapter
(section 70A-2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is
within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification
received by the other party that strict performance will be required
of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view
Readjustment of a material change of position in reliance on the
waiver.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
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Plaintiff.
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j U D G M E N T f SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
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vs.

f

Case No.

)£2&U
Defendant.

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly'is D granted D denied. There being no tegal or other reason whysentence
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted b^B^uury; D the c.otirt; a plea of guilty;
D pfea of no contest; of the offense of *~~t l)fT'Tm ;
a felony
of the ^
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready jor sentence and
represented by
^ and the State being represented by
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
D^of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
_ & _ &}&tj€/£D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ Arj QQU'; QQ
island ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ * 7 7 «
to
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

5r Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( p r i s o n ) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of. /ft MfKThS ., pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded intothecustody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
v
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
^ -m]:%
'«,
D Commitment shall issue
DATED this Jy2L_ day of
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_etermined byifte Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; B"at a rate of if\ ftUI
ba IA~J" RO ; or D at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete any
—
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with

D Participate in and complete any

training D as directed by the Department of Adult

Probation and Parole; or D with
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
D Submit to drug testing.
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
D Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
BTObtain and maintain full-time employment. Q-O HBUAJO
A lO&ck**
D Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with .
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
D^Defendant is to commit no crimes.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on
— _ — for a review of this sentence.
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Defendant.

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence"
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted by Bijury; Dthe court; D plea of guilty; • plea
of no contest;
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,
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
D
D
D
D
D
D

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
DATED this

A. day of -Oct
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

VS

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ARCHULETA, Dell D.

Court Case No:

Defendant

t^

891901028

Judge: Pat Brian

Def. A t t y . : Lisa Remal

)
) : ss

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Karl B a r t e l l , being duly sworn upon an oath deposes
and says t h a t :

He i s a Probation Officer for the Utah State Department of

C o r r e c t i o n s ; that on the 18th dav of September, 1989, the above-named
defendant was adjudged g u i l t y of the crime of Theft, a Second Degree
Felony in the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d Court and on the 6th day of October, 1989,
was sentenced to serve a term of 1-15 years in the Utah S t a t e Prison; that
the execution of the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant was
placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections; that the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d defendant did v i o l a t e the terms and
c o n d i t i o n s of the defendant's probation as f o l l o w s ,

vft

to-wit:

The defendant has v i o l a t e d his probation agreement byjw-oTaTting
c o n d i t i o n number 1; in that he has not submitted his^monthly report
May by the 5th of the month as agreed to by the defenSairtr

^-v .*"^ ^

/7r\

ARCHULETA, Dell D.
2.

-2-

The defendant has v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n agreement by v i o l a t i n g
c o n d i t i o n number 3; in t h a t he changed or e s t a b l i s h e d anotherV^es idence^
w i t h o u t n o t i f y i n g or knowledge of h i s p r o b a t i o n a g e n t . That the^Tnrme—v i s i t of the l a s t known a d d r e s s . A Mr. Boyd Byrner s t a t e d the defendan
i s l i v i n g with h i s s i s t e r a t a n o t h e r a d d r e s s ;
The defendant has v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n agreement by v i o l a t i n g
c o n d i t i o n number 10>-4ir-tira-t-^^ defendant f a i l e d to maintain
v e r i f i a b l e , lawfu<^employmenjt^hd/or e d u c a t i o n ;

/ 4 y > The defendant has v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n agreement by v i o l a t i n g
^ ^ / c o n d i t i o n number 11B; in t h a t t h e defendant has f a i l e d to pay the.
hy*
minimum amount set bv t h e Court of $100.00 per month towards h i $ fine
/
r e q u i r e d by the C o u r t ; and,
C^/

¥/

The defendant has v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n agreement by v i o l a t i n g
c^ji_di-t-i^n-^tmb^x_nG; in t h a t the defendant has f a i l e d to make anvCchil
s u p p o r t payments J ^ n d any payments toward t h e c h i l d support a r r e a r s ;
/ "^irft~ira~s'~to"1>e-at a r a t e of 3225.00 per month with t o t a l payments bein
$300.00 per month.
WHEREFORE, vour a f f i a n t

prays t h a t an Order of the Court i s s u e

d i r e c t i n g and r e q u i r i n g the above-named defendant

to be and appear b e f o r e

s a i d Court to show c a u s e , if any, he h a s , why t h e a f o r e s a i d period of
p r o b a t i o n should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be
forthwith

committed to t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n .

KARL/fiARTELL

PROBATION OFFICER

S u b s c r i b e d and sworn to b e f o r e me t h i s

R e s r a t n p : S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
Commission e x p i r e s :
r$-/*/"?V
NOTARY PUBLIC
GLYNN KIMBALL
275 East 200 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
My Commission ExpiresFebruary M. 1994

STATE OF UTAH

OOQO£

ADDENDUM D

Third Judicial District

LISA J. REMAL, (#2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

JUL
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[COUNTY

«£^mj^
Deputy (

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

:

ORDER

:
:

DELL D. ARCHULETTA,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No. 891901028FS
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN

After having heard the testimony of the witnesses presented
by the State and by the defendant, and having heard the arguments of
counsel,
The Court finds that the defendnat has violated his
probation as follows:
1.

The defendant failed to report to Adult Probation and

Parole in May, 1990, as alleged in allegation No. 1 of the Order to
Show Cause.
2.

The defendant failed to maintain verifiable, lawful

employment and/or education, as alleged in allegation No. 3 of the
Order to Show Cause.
3.

The defendant failed to pay $100 per month towards his

fine, as alleged in allegation No. 4 of the Order to Show Cause.

OQOQ2

4.

The defendant failed to pay a total of $300 per month

towards his child support obligation, as alleged in allegation No. 5
of the Order to Show Cause.
Based upon those findings,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's probation be
revoked and reinstated on probation for eighteen (18) months after
his release from jail upon the following conditions:
1.

That all conditions of probation previously imposed be

in effect.
2.

That he serve six months in jail with credit for time

3.

That within fifteen calendar days from his release from

served.

jail/ he be employed sixty hours per week, and that he provide
written verification of the same.
4.

That he be enrolled in vocational training as soon as

possible after his release from jail, but no later than ninety days
from that release; further that any costs he pays towards said
vocational training can be deducted from the fine previously
imposed.
DATED this

6

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE PAT
Third District Court

Appr/vecLa/s to form:
IDAS
rt^jCounty Attorney

OOOO'

